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Resource rent in aquaculture (RRA) is any payment to a farm and site owner, on land or sea, 
in excess of the costs needed to bring that farm into production. For analytic and policy 
purposes it may be useful to distinguish among different types of RRA. Three types will be 
discussed: rent associated with the classical economists Ricardo (1821) and Faustmann 
(1849), as well as oligopoly rent from access regulation (licensing) and hampered output. The 
latter can arise in the case of downward sloping demand for a particular type of seafood from 
an aquaculture country. The similarities and differences among these types of rent are 
discussed and the distinctions between business economics indicators and RRA are clarified. 
The theory is applied to the case of Atlantic salmon in Norway and white leg shrimp in 
Vietnam. Based on cost and revenue data for 2016 from 84 firms from the Directorate of 
Fisheries in Norway; and for 2014 from 318 farms and for 2016 for 120 farms from two 
surveys in Vietnam, both business economics and RRA indicators are calculated, after 
revealing the cost structure of the farms. In theory, the RRA rate may be higher or lower than 
the profit rate, depending on the capital structure and intensity of the firms. The analysis 
demonstrates very high profit and rent margins in the Norwegian salmon industry, and lower, 
but positive ones in Vietnam. However, the profit and rent rates are much higher in Vietnam 
due to the low capital intensity of the shrimp industry. 





The concept of resource rent is well known from the economic literature on oil, gas, and other 
minerals, as well as on agriculture, forestry and fisheries (Ricardo, 1821; Faustmann, 1849; 
Gordon, 1954). For seafood production, aquaculture in 2014 surpassed that of capture 
fisheries and is still expanding, whereas capture has come to a standstill (FAO, 2016; 
Nadarajah and Flaaten, 2017). Despite the increased importance of the former, resource rent 
issues are rarely discussed in connection with aquaculture. A pertinent question is – can 
resource rent be realized in aquaculture? Further, what kind of rent would this be, compared 
to what is found in other natural resource-based industries? Resource rent in fisheries is a 
natural point of departure for discussing resource rent in aquaculture (RRA) (Flaaten, Heen 
and Matthíasson, 2017). 
RRA is any payment to a farm and site owner, on land or sea, in excess of the costs 
needed to bring that farm into production, and different types of RRA may exist. Aqua-land is 
an inelastic factor of production, at least for good quality locations. In principle, sites could be 
ranked from the very best one suited for aquaculture farming to the marginal one where 
hardly anyone would be interested in establishing a farm, due to for example, bad water 
quality, sea and wave exposure, weather and climatic conditions, low biotechnical 
productivity, or costly distance to the input and output markets. The surplus that arises in 
agriculture due to the difference between the marginal and intra-marginal location is the 
differential rent, or “that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for 
the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil”, which is called Ricardo rent 
(Ricardo, 1821). In a way, the intra-marginal rent (IMR) in fisheries (Copes, 1972), 
corresponds to that in agriculture, where it usually arises from differences in the natural 
capital and beneficial distance to the input and output markets. In fisheries, however, IMR is 
mainly due to differences in the manmade capital, such as vessels and fishing gear, and the 
operational skills of skippers and crew (Duy et al., 2012). In aquaculture, differences in site-
specific nature characteristics may cause profitability differences among farms, and this can 
be classified as resource rent. Of course, operational means and skills of farms can differ, but 
this is not differential rent in the Ricardo-sense. 
Governments can authorize firms to establish aquaculture farms, and such institutional 
arrangements usually limit the number of farms compared to open access and competitive 
markets. When the aquaculture industry faces a downward sloping demand for its products, 
limitation on the number of licences may limit the output of fish, thereby increasing the price 
compared with that of perfect competition. This is the case whether the official arguments for 
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a licensing system are for environmental protection or market reasons. Thus, some returns are 
associated with legally enforced monopolies, oligopolies, or cartels through licensing; let us 
simply call this market rent, and together with the Ricardo rent it constitutes resource rent in 
aquaculture (RRA). In analysing the accounts of a firm, it can be difficult to disentangle 
market rent from Ricardo rent, but to do this is one of the objectives of what follows. The 
concepts of Faustmann rent, Ricardo rent, and market rent will be discussed theoretically, 
followed by accounting-based examples from shrimp (White leg shrimp, WLS, Litopenaeus 
vannamei) in Vietnam and Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) in Norway. 
2. THEORY OF RENT1  
2.1 The basic problem 
A fish farm with a given capacity, be it earthen ponds or floating cages in the sea, releases 
recruits into the cage, to use this terminology throughout, and feed the fish that grow. A key 
question is – when to harvest with the objective of maximizing the owner’s wealth? To 
simplify initially, the costs of recruits, feed, and slaughter are disregarded, and the emphasis is 
on discounting and wealth maximization. Let V(t) be the value of fish at time t and δ the 
interest rate, or opportunity cost of capital. The problem is to 𝑀𝐴𝑋𝑡 𝛱(𝑡) = 𝑉(𝑡)𝑒
−𝛿𝑡, using 
continuous time. We derive the first order condition (FOC) for the maximum, also called the 
simple Fisher condition: 
(1)   
𝑉′(𝑡)
𝑉(𝑡)
= 𝛿.  
The Fisher harvest time t* can implicitly be found from (1); though, for management 
this has for long been consider of very little importance (Samuelson, 1976). The relative value 
growth, on the left-hand side of (1), is, by assumption, declining, and this corresponds well to 
actual cases of biological growth (for a constant price per kg of fish).  
2.2 Faustmann – Rotation issues 
We have discussed optimality conditions for the release and harvest of one cohort, leading to 
equation (1). However, as soon as one cohort is harvested, it gives room for the next one to be 
released into the cage, immediately or after a while if the facilities need a fallow period for 
cleaning or repair. Since fish grow relatively slower with age, harvest of older fish may give 
room for younger and faster-growing fish, and this should be considered simultaneously with 
the economic issues discussed above. A sequence of rotations should be studied to find the 
                                                          
1 Some sentences and paragraphs are quotations from Flaaten, 2018. 
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best utilization of the total capital, including physical capital, fish capital, and site capital. The 
site has a value in itself, since good locations for aquaculture are in limited supply, both for 
earthen ponds and floating sea cages. Assuming that the parameters are constant across time, 
all the rotation periods will be of the same length, and each optimal rotation period proves to 
be shorter than the Fisher period (Guttormsen, 2008). The issue of seasonal growth and 
harvesting may be important for actual farm operation, but is excluded from this analysis 
(Jobling, 2003; Thyholdt, 2014).  Following the previous notation, V(t) is the value of fish at 
time t (age), disregarding the explicit costs of recruitment, feed, and slaughter. Instead of the 
Fisher rule (1), we now have the rotation rule, or Faustmann rule, as follows (see Annex): 
(2)  𝑉′(𝑡) = 𝛿𝑉(𝑡) +
𝛿𝑉(𝑡)𝑒−𝛿𝑡
1−𝑒−𝛿𝑡
= 𝛿𝑉(𝑡) + 𝛿
𝑉(𝑡)
𝑒𝛿𝑡−1
 ,  
where 𝑉′(𝑡) is the marginal change in fish biomass value and 𝛿𝑉(𝑡) is the opportunity 
cost of the fish biomass capital. The Faustmann rule from (2) is introduced by Martin 
Faustmann (1822-1876) and formulated in a forestry context where trees grow in a similar 
way as fish, but at a much slower pace. Implicitly we can find the optimal rotation length t** 
from equation (2). The second part of the second term on the rhs of (2),  
𝑉(𝑡)
𝑒𝛿𝑡−1 
, is the site 
value, or the natural resource capital of the aquaculture farm. The site value multiplied by the 
interest rate δ, gives the opportunity cost of the fish farm itself. This warrants some further 
comments. Recall that the present value of an eternal stream of A dollars annually at the 
instantaneous interest rate of 𝛿 is 
𝐴
𝛿
, with δ as a fraction. The value of a one-dollar investment 
today at time t is 𝑒𝛿𝑡, and (𝑒𝛿𝑡 − 1), the denominator of the last term on the rhs of (2), is the 
added value at time t of a one-dollar investment today. The net harvest value in aquaculture, 
V(t), emanates at the end of each rotation period, and not (usually not) annually as A in this 
example. The actual rotation period may be more than a year (salmon) or shorter (tropical 
shrimp). 








From the discussion and assumptions above, we know that the lhs of (3) declines with 
t, and since the denominator on the rhs is less than unity the value of the rhs is greater than δ. 
Thus, the Faustmann rule leads to an optimal age of harvest t**<t*. Figure 1 illustrates this, 
using 𝑉(𝑡)𝑒−𝛿𝑡 = 𝑝(𝑤)𝑤(𝑡)𝑅𝑒−𝑀𝑡𝑒−𝛿𝑡 in the Faustmann equation (3), with p(w) = size 
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dependent price of fish, w(t) = weight of fish, R = number of recruits, M = natural mortality, 








The lhs of equation (4) graphically is the downward sloping relative growth curve of 
fish in Figure 1. The rhs of equation (4) is also downward sloping, asymptotically towards 
δ+M. This implies that the optimal rotation period is shorter when many rotations are 
included, t**, in the analysis instead of just a single cycle, t*. Age dependent costs, such as 
feed, will affect the optimal rotation period (further reduction from t**) and so will seed costs 
in the many rotations case; for a discussion of the cases of costs of recruits, feed and 
slaughter, see Flaaten, 2018. 
 
Figure 1. The Fisher single rotation optimal age of harvest is t*, whereas the Faustmann 
optimal multiple rotations age of harvest is t**.  
Source: See Annex – Fish growth. 
 
As noted above, the main three types of capital in aquaculture are physical capital, fish 
capital, and site capital. Disregarding the physical capital, to simplify, the distinction between 
fish and site capital is demonstrated by the Faustmann rule in (2). If, underlining if, the 






 is the site value of the farm in the general case. Note that the rotation 
time t in (2) - (3) is endogenous, to be derived from this analysis; for fast growing tropical 
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species, such as shrimp, the rotation period is usually well below one year, whereas for 
temperate fish, such as salmon, the rotation time traditionally has been two–three years. 
Faustmann rent will vary with environmental, biological, economic, and other characteristics 
of importance for the establishment and operation of an aquaculture farm. Price of fish is a 
very important element of the numerator of the site value, and this will vary with type of 
market, be it competitive or oligopoly. The same applies to the operating costs that often vary 
among farms. Thus, the concept of Faustmann rent is related to a single farm at a given 
location. However, in the empirical analysis below, Faustmann site value and rent often have 
to be calculated for a multi-farm firm as the average across locations or farms. This is, in 
particular, the case for salmon firms, whereas the investigated shrimp farms mainly are “one 
firm/family–one farm”.  
2.3 Ricardo rent 
The basic fisheries economic model (Gordon, 1954) demonstrates that in equilibrium, the 
potential resource rent is wasted under open access if the fleet consists of homogenous 
vessels. However, it is also known that producers’ surplus, called IMR in fisheries, may exist 
even under open-access equilibrium (Copes, 1972). In aquaculture, differences in site-specific 
nature characteristics may also cause profitability differences among farms. This resembles 
the issues discussed by Ricardo for agriculture and warrants further discussion. A Heckser-
Salter diagram may help explaining this. For an aquaculture industry with n firms, this is done 
by ranking the firms according to increasing production cost per kg production, with the 
lowest cost firm to the left, as in Figure 2. Thus, firm one, to the left, is the most cost-efficient 
and firm n the least cost-efficient.  
Cost influences the outcome value of aquaculture firms, illustrated by the function 
V(t). For heterogeneous firms rent may differ due to natural characteristics or managerial 
skills and real capital. The former resembles what is called Ricardo rent; the difference 
between the produce obtained by the employment of two equal quantities of capital and labor. 
To distinguish between rent caused by differences in natural characteristics and managerial 
skills/capital in empirical analysis requires micro data, including locational data. In the 
empirical sections of this paper, such data is not available and therefore the theoretical 
discussion is kept simple, without including heterogeneity into the V(t) function.   
If the firms produce a homogenous product for a competitive market, the law of one 
price exists. Moreover, profit per kg of product decreases from the left to the right. On the 
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other hand, if e.g. transport costs, product quality, or the degree of processing differ, the farm 
gate price will also differ, to change the profit ranking of firms. Therefore, perfect (negative) 













Figure 2. Ricardo rent in the regulated market (Q
R
) is HEFG; and in the non-regulated market 
(Q
C
) is HECG; Market rent in the regulated market (Q
R
) is ABFG  
2.4 Market rent 
In Figure 2, with the upward sloping marginal cost curve c, the competitive equilibrium is at 
point C with total production equal to QC for the downward sloping demand D. The Ricardo 
rent in this case is the area GCEH. If the industry is regulated to remove or to avoid entering 
of the least cost-efficient firms, total production is reduced to QR in Figure 2, implying a loss 
in the Ricardo rent equivalent to the area FCE. However, there is a market rent gain of ABFG, 
and if this exceeds CFE there will be a net gain for the industry, disregarding consumer 
surplus and regulation cost. As Figure 2 indicates, it is possible that the total industry gains 
from an output constrained regulation if demand is inelastic; that is, if the industry has some 
market power (Norwegian salmon to be discussed below). On the other hand, if the industry is 
a price taker in the world market, with horizontal demand, output regulations will cause a loss 
of Ricardo rent (shrimp in Vietnam to be discussed). For aquaculture industries, resource rent 





 Q (quantity) 












water and land/space, just as with other resource industries such as fisheries, forestry, 
agriculture, hydroelectric power, minerals, and oil and gas. 
If industry regulation affects production of each firm, for example by licences or feed 
quotas, and not just the least cost-efficient ones as discussed above, the width of every bar in 
Figure 2 may be affected. Relaxation or constraining of regulations will probably affect both 
the width and the heights of the bars in Figure 2. When regulation effectively constrains 
production and increases unit costs of a firm, there will, in principle, be an opportunity cost 
inflicted upon the firm. We could ask – what is the firm’s willingness to pay for getting rid of 
regulations and to expand production, fully or partly? However, it could be that even though a 
single firm would prefer to avoid regulations affecting itself, the laissez-faire policy with no 
industry regulations would be even worse due to competition. This is a parallel to the issue of 
cheating in a cartel or in a cooperative game. Problems like this exist in many aquaculture 
industries, including for salmon in Norway.  
The relationship between Faustmann rent on the one hand and the Ricardo and market 
rent on the other, warrants some comments. The site value was derived above and the 
Faustmann rent as 𝛿
𝑉(𝑡)
𝑒𝛿𝑡−1
. From the discussion in relation to Figure 2, V(t) can be seen as the 
combined market and Ricardo rent for each farm, implying that the Faustmann rent varies 
between farms the same way as the Ricardo rent per farm varies. Farms to the left in Figure 2 
have a higher Faustmann rent and site value than less cost-efficient farms to the right. In 
addition, site value and Faustmann rent also depend on whether the industry is output 
regulated or not, and on the industry market power. The highest site value is expected for 
cost-efficient farms in an output regulated industry with market power, whereas (almost) 
homogenous aquaculture farms exporting as price takers to a competitive world market 
should not be expected to have site values above the opportunity cost of capital in the area. 
These issues shall be further discussed below in relation to the shrimp and salmon industries 
of Vietnam and Norway, respectively.  
3. SHRIMP AQUACULTURE IN VIETNAM AND SALMON AQUACULTURE 
IN NORWAY 
Norway and Vietnam are among the largest aquaculture producers in the world. In 2016, the 
total cultured production in Norway was 1,326 thousand tonnes and the corresponding figure 
for Vietnam was 3,625. Even though Norway produced a smaller amount compared to 
Vietnam, it is ranked as the second largest exporter in the world, reaching USD 10.8 billion 
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and 7.1 percent. Vietnam, with exports of USD 7.3 billion, is the world’s third largest 
exporter. The main species for aquaculture in Norway is salmon, whereas most of the export 
revenue in Vietnam comes from shrimp and the white fish pangasius. Aquaculture is thus a 
significant industry in the two countries, contributing to income, jobs, food security, and 
nutrition.  
Shrimp have been cultured in Vietnam since the 1990s. Since that time, the industry 
has developed rapidly and become a significant contributor to the country in terms of income 
generation, employment, food security, and nutrition. The growth performance of this sector 
was reflected in the increase of the farming area for shrimp from 93,000 ha in 1990 to 
721,100 ha in 2017 (VASEP, 2018). In that year, total brackish water shrimp production in 
Vietnam was estimated at 683.4 thousand tonnes valued at USD 3.15 billion, with a 
contribution of 50 percent in total export value of seafood products. Shrimp were exported to 
more than 90 markets, of which 95 percent of the volume goes to the US, the EU, Japan, 
China, South Korea, Australia, Canada, ASEAN, Taiwan, and Switzerland. Currently, 11.4 
percent of the total shrimp production is eco-labelled and certified by the agencies and 
standards, such as Best Aquaculture Practices (BAP), the Aquaculture Stewardship Council 
(ASC), GLOBALG.A.P. Aquaculture Standard, and, for organic products, Naturland.  
WLS is one of the main commercial-oriented cultured species, which was encouraged 
by the government in 2006. The practice of WLS aquaculture is popular in the Central and the 
South of Vietnam. In 2014, there were 98,866 ha under operation and this represented 5.9 
percent of the total aquaculture area. Even though the area devoted to farming is modest, it 
achieved 324,581 tonnes, which accounts for 27.3 percent of the total aquaculture production.  
At present, shrimp farms operate as extensive, semi-intensive, and intensive farming 
systems. These three systems are classified mainly based on the levels of inputs such as 
stocking densities, water use, feed and chemicals used, and levels of outputs. In addition, 
integrated farming systems are also broadly practised, such as rice-cum-fish, rice-cum-prawn, 
and mangrove-cum-aquaculture. The nature of extensive farming means it requires less 
stocking densities, casual feeding, and tidal water exchange surpassed. Water was mainly 
pumped, with limited exchange, and the feed is in wet form. With intensive farming, stocking 
densities are higher, feed is in manufactured pellet form, water is exchanged more often and a 
greater percentage of chemicals is used. The semi-intensive farming is operated somewhere in 
between extensive farming and intensive farming.  
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However, aquaculture in Vietnam is still small-scale with free-entry into farming. The 
coastal spatial planning was applied in some regions recently and, accordingly, all the new 
and old farms are obligated to move into planning areas. However, this strategy has not 
succeeded due to poor plan, weak implementation, and lack of adequate controls and 
surveillance (Long et al., 2016). The infrastructure of the farming area is in poor condition, 
most of the farms are at a household scale, there are few or even no sewage ponds, and culture 
procedures are not applied properly; therefore, the farms face risks of infectious disease 
outbreaks as well as environmental pollution. The hatchery production is dependent on the 
parent stocks, which are imported, and therefore it is hard to control the sources and quality. 
Several forests have been cut down for shrimp aquaculture, many beautiful beaches are 
polluted, and the danger of exhaustion and salinization of land and underground water is at 
stake.  
Salmon aquaculture in Norway started as small-scale production in the 1960s and 
1970s, and in the 1980s gradually expanded to become an important export industry. In the 
beginning, the market price of the close substitute wild caught salmon was high and benefited 
aquaculture that could expand even at a high cost. In 1985 the cost per kg was almost 90 NOK 
(USD 10.7) per kg, measured in 2016 value, and the production was about 50 thousand tonnes 
(Fiskeridirektoratet, 2017). Technological change and other cost reducing innovations reduced 
production cost to 33.86 NOK per kg in 2016. The production in this period increased by a 
factor of about 25. The salmon price has also come down (with some fluctuations) during this 
period, but in most years, it stayed well above the average cost and made this industry one of 
the most profitable in Norway. Note, however, that production costs reached their lowest level 
about a decade earlier, and from 2005 to 2016 the costs have roughly doubled, measured in 
nominal values per kg production. Even though we consider inflation, the cost increase is over 
60 percent. 
 Increased feed costs and increased costs for monitoring, prevention and treatment of 
salmon lice (Lepeophtheirus salmonis) are the most important explanations for cost increases. 
Salmon lice are a natural parasite on salmonids in saltwater in the northern hemisphere. The 
lice eat skin, mucus, and blood on the fish, and can make large wounds if there are many of 
them on a fish. The lice costs are still high, at around 5 billion NOK a year in 2016, but the 
growth in lice costs has decreased (Iversen et al., 2017, pp.47). There are also other costly 
negative externalities, but it is outside the scope of this paper to estimate such costs. 
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In Norway, limited entry through licensing has been the main policy instrument from 
the early 1970s, since the preliminary Aquaculture Law enacted in 1973. All fish farms need a 
licence to enter and operate in the industry. The present Aquaculture Act entered into force in 
January 2016, and is followed up by more detailed rules and regulations. Farm size is, since 
2005, limited by a maximum allowable biomass (MAB), 780 or 945 tonnes of live biomass, 
per licence, depending on geographical location (fish capital restriction implying hampered 
output). When the first regulations through licensing took place in the 1970s, a limit on cage 
size (capital restriction) was the main instrument to control development, and in 1996 feed 
quotas (input restriction) were introduced. This required reporting of production and feed 
consumption data. Throughout the history of salmon aquaculture in Norway, licences have 
been used to include both technical regulations and input controls with the objective of 
reducing environmental externalities such as fish escape, parasites, and sludge and nutrient 
salt emissions (Aarset and Jakobsen, 2009; Liu et al., 2011; Hersoug, Mikkelsen and Karlsen, 
2018). Aquaculture licences are transferable between firms, but there is a limit (40 percent) to 
how much one firm may acquire. A licence, for MAB, allows the establishment and operation 
of a farm, provided an approved location is available, but this is not a real property right for a 
given space in the coastal zone. The location is allowed as long the licence is used for actual 
operation within the legal limits of laws and regulations. Nevertheless, a licence and a good 
location can be worth about 100 million NOK (USD 12 million, 2018) (B. Hersoug, UiT – 
The Arctic University of Norway, personal communication).  
 
4. RESOURCE RENT IN SHRIMP AND SALMON PRODUCTION 
4.1 Data 
Both primary data and secondary data are used. Regarding the Norwegian salmon case, we 
use 2016 data from the Directorate of Fisheries of 84 firms, representing 68.3 percent of the 
active licences. With respect to the Vietnamese WTS case, data is based on the synthetic 
results of Long et al. (2016) for 318 farming households that took place in 2014. These 
households are in four regions of the South-Central Vietnam: Quang Ngai, Khanh Hoa, Phu 
Yen, Ninh Thuan, and operate on 6,922 ha, representing 79.4 percent and 7.5 percent of the 
farming area of the South-Central’s population and the whole country, respectively. Since the 
cost and earning data 2014 at farm level is not available, we used cost and earning data of 120 
farming households in 2016 in Phu Yen province to allow us explore and compare the 




4.2.1 Resource rent 
Based on the data, total natural resource rent for salmon and shrimp is calculated in Table 1. 
This is the combined Ricardo and market rent. We shall return to the disentangling of these 
two and to the Faustmann rent. 
 Table 1. Resource rent in aquaculture (RRA); The salmon industry in Norway 2016 and the 
white leg shrimp industry in four provinces of Vietnam 2014 
Concept Explanation Norway 









₋   Total operating 
expenses 
Including recruits, feed, chemicals, 
medicine, labour, energy, slaughter, 
maintenance, and depreciation of farm, 





= Operating profit 
(EBIT) 




+   Total financial 
revenue 
Financial income and currency gains. 530.7 
(63.2) 
0.0  
₋   Total financial 
expenses  
Financial cost and currency rate losses. 495.4 
(59.0) 
0.06  
                                                          
2 Exchange rate (transfer rate) 30/12/2016: 8.4 NOK/USD. This rate is applied to Tables 2 and 3. 
3 The figures are calculated based on the average figures per ha multiplied by the total aquaculture area of the 
four regions 
4 Exchange rate (buying rate) 30/12/2014: 21,380 VND/USD. This rate is also applied for Table 2.  
5 Almost 90% is Atlantic salmon, the remaining is trout. Based on the 84 firms reported in the Directorate of 
Fisheries, 2017. They have 743 licenses out of the population of 1088. 
6 As the shrimp farmers do not export shrimp directly to the international markets, financial cost due to currency 




= Profit on ordinary 






+   Depreciation on 
intangible capital  





+   Financial cost of 
intangible capital 
Financial cost (interests, fees) of licence 




₋   Calculated interest 
on equity 
The interest rate should equal what is paid 
on long-term loans, or equal to interest on 





= RRA unadjusted The residual for the aquaculture industry 
owners, without deduction of 





Operating margin EBIT in percent of revenue. 36.0 9.6 
Net profit margin EBT in percent of revenue 36.1 9.6 
Resource rent margin RRA in percent of revenue 34.7 7.2 
Sources: Flaaten, Heen and Matthíasson, 2017. Data Norway: Fiskeridirektoratet (2017); Knut Heen, 
UiT – The Arctic University of Norway (personal communication); Data Vietnam: Long et al. (2016) 
Table 1 presents the economic performance of salmon and WLS farms. The resource 
rent margin is 34.7 and 7.2 for the Norwegian and Vietnamese case, respectively. We observe 
about the same pattern for the net profit margin. In both cases, the resource rent margin with 
RRA is slightly lower than the net profit margin, mainly due to the calculated interest on 
equity. The same applies when comparing with the operating margin. Differences in market 
power may be a major explanation of the difference in performance between the two resource 
industries. We will return to this in the Discussion section. For economic efficiency 
comparison, the indicators in Table 1, with revenue in the denominator, have some 
deficiencies. An alternative, usually recommended in business economics, is to use capital in 
                                                          
7 It is a bit odd that this number is negative; purchases of farms/licenses with negative goodwill may be an 
explanation (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2017). 
8 Based on 4% real annual rate of interest recommended by the Ministry of Finance as opportunity cost of capital 
in long-term public investment projects. 
9 Interest rate is 12% per year. 
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the denominator. Capital and return rates are demonstrated in Table 2, with five types of 
capital; fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, financial fixed assets, fish capital – live and 
processed, and other current assets. 
Table 2. Capital and return rates; The salmon industry in Norway 2016 and the White 
leg shrimp industry in Vietnam 2014 






Total tangible fixed assets  
Including land, buildings, and other 
real property, plant and machinery, 
operating equipment 
9,928.4 11,663.6 
(1,181.9)  (0.55) 
Intangible fixed assets  
Including licences and goodwill 
reported in the firm accounts 
6,563.2 0 
(781.3)   
Financial fixed assets  
Including ownership/shares in other 
firms – aquaculture and others 
3,699.4) 0 
(440.4)   
Fish stocks  Live and processed 
16,413.1 9,666.6 
(1,953.9) (0.45) 
Other current assets, excl. fish 
stocks  
 
Including receivables, investments, 
bank deposits, and cash at bank 
18,218.6 0.0 
(2,168.9)   





Return on total assets (ROC) 
(profit rate)  
 
EBT + financial expenses in percent of 
total assets (equals EBIT plus financial 





Resource rent rate (RRR) 
Unadjusted RRA in percent of total 
minus intangible assets  
36.0 70.0 
Sources: NORWAY: Fiskeridirektoratet (2017); Knut Heen, UiT – The Arctic University of Tromsø 
(personal communication); VIETNAM: Long et al. (2016); Long Le Kim, University of Nha Trang, 
Vietnam (personal communication) 
The business economic indicator ROC in Table 2 tells how effectively a farm utilizes 
its capital assets to generate profit and remuneration of the external capital. However, for 
shrimp in Vietnam, the assets are very low in value compared to the operating expenses, 
notably seed, feed, electricity, and labour. Therefore, traditional capital return indicators, such 
as ROC as well as RRR, are hardly useful in this case as they reach unbelievable values. The 
                                                          




indicator RRR is closer to a welfare economic indicator, excluding the private value of 
purchased rights, etc. from the calculation, but also this has the capital in the denominator. In 
conclusion, for a developing country with relatively little capital in the aquaculture production 
process, indicators based on return related to revenue are probably better indicators for intra- 
as well as inter-industry comparison of firm performance.  
4.2.2 Ricardo rent 
Based on the theoretical discussion and the data, Heckser-Salter figures are shown in Figures 
3 and 4 for salmon and shrimp, respectively. These figures illustrate the cost-efficiency of 
heterogeneous salmon firms and shrimp farms in Norway and Vietnam in 2016. The width of 
the bars shows the relative production. This is measured by the production of each farm 
divided by average production of all the farms; thus, the total production is equal to the 
number of farms surveyed. In Vietnam, the total relative production is 120 and this figure is 
83 for Norway. The height of the bars measures the average cost per kg for each farm. The 
average total cost includes smolt, seed, feed, chemicals, insurance, slaughter, labour, 
depreciation, and others. The upper horizontal line AR presents the average revenue per kg, 
and the lower AR is estimated for the competitive market.  
 
Figure 3. Cost-efficiency of 83 Norwegian salmon firms in 201611 
                                                          






















AR (in regulated market) = 50.6 
(NOK/kg) 




Data source: Directorate of Fisheries, 2017. 
 
Figure 3 indicates that few of the Norwegian firms have a unit cost higher than the 
average revenue, whereas in Figure 4 this is not so in Vietnam, where about one-third of the 
farms have higher unit cost than unit revenue. In Figure 3, the bigger firms are scattered 
somewhat arbitrarily along the x-axis, and not leaning to the left, indicating that the notion of 
“big is beautiful” may not hold in this case. This is somewhat in line with what was reported 
by the Directorate of Fisheries (2017). In contrast to the Norwegian salmon case, some of the 
large shrimp farms seem to make better profits than the small ones (Figure 4). This does not 
contradict the Norwegian case, “big” farms here are still very small compared to Norwegian 
farms, in particular regarding production and capital.  
 
Figure 4. Cost-efficiency of 120 shrimp farms in Vietnam in 2016 
Data source: Own data 
 
Since both Vietnamese farms and Norwegian firms differ with respect to cost, they 
may also differ with respect to revenue. A correlation analysis between unit cost and unit 
EBIT may give an indication. The correlation coefficient between unit cost and unit EBIT is 



























AR = 87.2 (1000 VND/kg) 
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−0.89 and −0.79 at 1% significant level, for shrimp and salmon, respectively. Figures 5 and 6 
give the graphical pictures of how cost and operating profit vary across firms. For example, in 
Norway, firm 4 has unit costs smaller than the average revenue but it has negative EBIT, 
whereas firm 10 with unit costs above the average revenue produces more valuable fish than 
the average and hence makes a good profit. The same also applies to Vietnamese shrimp 
producers, where 48 farms have unit costs higher than average revenue, but three of them 
have positive unit EBIT and one breaks even. Two farms receive a loss even though they have 
lower unit costs than the average revenue. The survey shows that many farmers use bio-
products recently as inputs, and therefore there are fewer diseases for shrimp and higher 
production as a consequence. 
 
Figure 5. Unit cost and Unit EBIT of 120 shrimp farms in Vietnam in 2016 



















Unit cost Unit EBIT
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Figure 6. Unit cost and Unit EBIT of 83 salmon firms in Norway in 2016 
Data source: Directorate of Fisheries, 2017. 
 
 4.2.3 Market rent 
Norwegian-produced Atlantic salmon has more than half of the world market, and a 
downward sloping demand exists (Brækkan, 2014; Brækkan et al., 2018). Thus, limits on 
Norwegian production have an effect on the world market price and the revenue of own 
salmon farms. 
 
Figure 7. Market rent of Norwegian salmon industry in the competitive and regulated markets.  
  Using a constant elasticity demand function Q = A𝑃  , with the 2016 figures Q=956 
thousand tonnes, P=50.6 NOK per kg, and ɛ=−0.46, we derive the demand curve of 
Norwegian salmon12 𝑄 = 5812 ∗ 𝑃−0.46. The elasticity of demand is −0.46, borrowed from 
Brækkan (2014) who estimates, within a world market model, that a one percent increase in 
Norwegian salmon production reduces the world market price by almost half a percent.  
                                                          
12 Includes trout production. The 2016 revenue, PQ, in Figure 7 is slightly lower than the revenue in Table 1, 
since the latter includes other operating revenues, such as insurance compensation, sale of roe and feed, as well 





The industry marginal cost curve is assumed to have power shape, with the estimated 
function 𝑀𝐶(𝑄) = 2.232 ∗ 𝑄0.223. The function is simulated using 83 Norwegian salmon 
firms where data for MC is the unit cost of 83 firms, and Q is the cumulative production from 
the most efficient firm to the least efficient firm. In the competitive market, the equilibrium 
price and quantity are, by assumption, at the intersection of the demand and the cost curves, 
equal to 43.7 NOK/kg and 1023 thousand tonnes. However, the current average price in 2016 
is recorded to be higher (50.6 NOK/kg) and the quantity sold is less (956 thousand tonnes) 
than those in the competitive market. This implies that there might be market power in the 
regulated market, benefiting the Norwegian salmon firms. The market rent is defined as the 
area created by the additional price gained due to restriction of the entry multiplied by the 
quantity sold (Figures 2 and 7).  
Shrimp exports from Vietnam are about ten percent of the world market and, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are no indications in the literature that this industry achieves any 
market rent. 
4.2.4 Faustmann rent and site value  




discussed above, and on an annual interest rate of 8 percent, as well as the optimum age of 
harvest 680 days (Figure 1 and Annex). The same principles have been used for Vietnamese 
shrimp farms, based on the optimal age of harvest, equal to 112 days per cycle with three 
cycles per year (Wijayanto et al., 2017), adjusted to 122 days to take into account the fallow 
days for rest, cleaning, and repair. The annual interest rate is 12 percent, reflecting the market 
rate in 2016. 
On average, the Faustmann site value per salmon firm is 1,220 Million NOK. As 
discussed above, Faustmann rent partly consists of and is affected by Ricardo rent and market 
rent, but does not come as a rent in addition to these two. There is a great variation in site 
value among the salmon firms and this is illustrated in Figure 8. As can be seen in Figure 8a, 
some of the salmon firms have extremely high site value, whereas others have nothing. The 
latter ones tend to fail against the least cost-efficient group.  
The result indicates that the values are also varied among the groups. The value is 
approximately 910.0 Million NOK per firm on average for the high cost-efficiency group. 
This is almost double for the average one (1,512.6 Million NOK), and around two-thirds for 
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the low one (623.7 Million NOK). It is noted that the average group has almost the same 
median value compared to the high group and its third quantile is large. This indicates that site 




Figure 8. Faustmann site value of the Norwegian salmon firms. Figure 8a) per firm, ranking 
from the most cost-efficient one to the least cost-efficient one; Figure 8b) of the three cost-
efficient groups: High is for 17 most cost-efficient firms; Average is for 49 middle cost-
efficient firms; Low is for 17 least cost-efficient firms. The boxplot displays the site value of 
the three groups with minimum, first quantile, median, third quantile, and maximum value. 
The red dashed line is the average group site value.  
Figure 9 illustrates the resource rent (Ricardo and market rent) in each of the 83 Norwegian 
salmon firms, ranking from the most cost-efficient to the left to the least cost-efficient to the 
right. Note that firms with middle cost-efficiency seem to have higher resource rent than those 
that have low or high cost-efficiency. This group captures both market rent and Ricardo rent, 
whereas the high cost-efficient group to the left seems to have more Ricardo rent than market 
rent. The least cost-efficient ones to the right have a small amount of resource rent, and this 




































Figure 9. Resource rent of 83 Norwegian salmon firms, 2016. 
 
In contrast to the Norwegian salmon industry, the Faustmann site value of Vietnamese shrimp 
farming is relatively small, with only 1,338 Million VND (60,000 USD) per farm on average. 
The distribution of resource rent, in this case only Ricardo rent, across the Phu Yen farms, is 
shown in Figure 10. Many farms do not gain any site values. The value is likely to decrease 
when the farms are less cost-efficient (Figure 11a). This is further illustrated in Figure 11b. 
Particularly, the site value of the high cost-efficient group is equal to 3,240 Million VND per 
farm on average and ranked as the highest value group, following by the average group with 
700 Million NOK, and the low one with least cost-efficiency has no value. The pattern is 
different from that of the Norwegian case, because the shrimp farms have been operating in a 
competitive market, and therefore the market rent is depleted and the Faustmann site value 

























Figure 11. Faustmann site value of the Vietnamese shrimp farms based: Figure 11a) per farm, 
ranking from the most cost-efficient one to the least cost-efficient one; Figure 11b) of the 
three cost-efficient groups, and each group consists of 40 farms. The boxplot displays the site 
value of the three groups with minimum, first quantile, median, third quantile, and maximum 









































































































4.2.5 Rent summary 
Table 3 summarizes the types of resource rent for the surveyed salmon firms and shrimp 
farms in 2016, as well as the average Faustmann rent per firm/farm.  
Table 3: Summary of rents in the surveyed Norwegian salmon firms and Vietnamese shrimp 
farms, 2016 
 Rent type 
Norway  Vietnam13 
Million NOK  
(Million USD) 
Million VND  
(Million USD)14 

























5. DISCUSSION  
The economic performance analysis of the salmon industry in Norway includes 84 firms with 
743 licences out of the population of 1088, and is considered representative for the national 
industry (Directorate of Fisheries, 2017). The first two tables include, for Vietnam, data for 
WLS in four provinces, and as such, the material is considered representative. However, 
shrimp production also comprises other species than WLS, mainly tiger shrimp (Penaeus 
monodon), and several other provinces than the four. Even though the revenue and cost data 
in Table 1 is limited in scope, we think the performance indicators are close to the truth for 
the shrimp industry, even though not necessarily statistically representative for the whole 
country.  
                                                          
13 Based on 2016 data for 120 farms in Phu Yen province. 
14 Exchange rate (buying rate) 31/12/2016: 22,720 VND/USD.  
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As demonstrated above the RRA and the profitability for salmon in Norway in 2016 
was very high. Despite a declining market share since 2010 this country still has more than 
half of the global market for aqua cultured Salmo salar. With more than 50 percent of the 
world Atlantic salmon supply,15 this gives the industry as a whole opportunity to affect the 
price. Restricted production through the licensing system and environmental regulations have 
gained the industry market rent. Even though the production and export have increased for 
more than three decades, demand has risen steadily and outpaced supply (Brækkan, 2014; 
Brækkan et al., 2018). Increased output and increased price simultaneously is very rare in 
international trade, but nevertheless occurred for salmon and made the Norwegian industry 
very profitable from the market rent gain. As a contrast, Vietnam has a market share of about 
ten percent for shrimp in the world market, which is much less than the more than 50 percent 
Norway has for salmon. Thus, Vietnam faces a greater competition and it is hard to influence 
the price positively in the world market. The open-access strategy for aquaculture in Vietnam 
also leads to very limited restriction on entry of farms and production.  
The average Faustmann site value of salmon firms equals 1,220 million NOK (134.6 
million USD) in Table 3. With an average of 8.85 licences per firm, this corresponds to a site 
value per licence of about 138 million NOK in 2016. Compare this to the statement “a licence 
and a good location can be worth about 100 million NOK (USD 12 million, 2018)” given 
above. This discrepancy indicates that salmon firms use a higher discount rate than the eight 
percent used for Table 3, reflecting the uncertainty regarding i.e. governmental regulation and 
taxation (see below). It could also be that the industry estimates higher future costs and lower 
market price than the historic averages used for Table 3. Of course, it could be that other 
experts would have given higher value estimates than 100 million NOK; transfer prices are 
not officially recorded. Overall, the findings in this paper match reported market values of 
licences pretty well. 
With de facto supply restriction of all the Norwegian salmon firms, each of them 
would gain from an own expansion, especially when price is significantly higher than 
marginal cost. This puts pressure on the regulatory system with monitoring, control and 
enforcement (MCE) of more than one thousand locations. It is also not straightforward to tell 
if the facilities in one location contain more or less than the MAB quota of 780/945 tonnes of 
                                                          
15 In 2010, Norway produced 65.4 percent of the world’s farmed Atlantic salmon. In 2014 its market share had 
fallen to less than 53 percent, but stayed at about this level until including 2017 
(https://salmonbusiness.com/norways-market-share-shrinking/ downloaded 12 November, 2018). 
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live fish. In addition, there is a limit on the average number of female lice per salmon, as well 
as other environmental regulations related to such as vaccination of fish, disease treatment, 
fish escape, and cleaning of nets. Management and environmental costs are not deducted from 
the calculated resource rent; although this is important, it is left for future research. For 
salmon lice, control cost for the firm is included in operating costs. Still, it does not account 
for negative effects for wild fish, shrimp etc. Access regulation with transferable licences and 
permits imply industry accumulation of intangible capital, but in the firm accounts for 2016, 
this type of cost is relatively small compared to the additional revenue gained from higher 
export prices. 
If environmental external costs were included, the RRA would have been lower. In the 
case of Vietnam, it might come closer to zero (Long et al., 2016). This because shrimp 
aquaculture is considered to cause environmental problems, such as mangrove deforestation 
(Barbier & Cox., 2004), chemical and waste discharge, and spread of disease and parasites 
(Huy & Maeda, 2015; Hedberg et al., 2018). The survey (Long et al., 2016) shows that most 
of the farms do not have waste treatment systems and the waste discharges directly into the 
coastal area. Even though large shrimp farming enterprises normally have waste treatment 
systems, the systems are still very modest. According to field surveys in all four provinces in 
2014, the farmers often use ground water in coastal areas due to surface water pollution. The 
water is processed through a settling pond system before being used. The intensive shrimp 
farming is relatively costly and faces significant risk during the production period. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that most shrimp farmers respond that water pollution is the main risk in 
the South-Central region (Long et al, 2016). 
Generally, economy of scale of the farms helps reduce cost per unit and improves 
margins, and thus return may grow at a faster rate than assets, ultimately increasing return on 
assets. However, Table 2 shows that even though the Vietnamese shrimp farms are much 
smaller than the Norwegian ones, the relative return on total assets in Vietnam is 2.8 times 
higher than in Norway, although we have raised some concern about use of capital related 
indicators when capital intensity differ between industries. To investigate the economy of 
scale across industries and countries is not a straightforward exercise and shall not be pursued 
in this paper (Asche et al., 2013 could be a point of departure). 
As noted above, there is a decreasing trend of the WLS industry in the South-Central 
Vietnam. The area used dropped from 6,222 ha in 2010 to 4,846 ha in 2014, and the 
production has been reduced by 11.7 percent during that period (MARD, 2015). The rapid 
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development of intensive WLS farming has, after a short expansion period, led to inefficient 
use of inputs of production. In the long run, this resulted in adverse effects on the growth and 
sustainable development. Consequently, many shrimp farms went bankrupt and had to leave 
the industry. Polluting emissions from shrimp culture, mainly nitrogen (from faeces and 
excess feed) and antibiotics, have altered local ecosystems and led to water pollution. 
Contaminated water is considered the main cause of disease outbreaks and drug resistance as 
happened in 2012 and 2013 on the South-Central Coast (Long et al., 2016). Whereas the 
intensive farming model tends to reduce the area needed, the area of semi-intensive farming, 
which is considered less pollutant, has increased, and more than doubled from 2,288 ha in 
2010 to 4,772 in 2014.  
The Norwegian Parliament and Government have both expressed interest in using taxes to 
capture a share of the resource rents in aquaculture, as have been done for other natural 
resources such as oil and gas, hydroelectric power, and mineral ore. As demonstrated in this 
paper, the salmon industry has benefited Ricardo and market rents from regulations, 
increasing the Faustmann site values to very high levels. For the policy makers and the public, 
this has created a debate about environmental issues, efficiency, and equity. Environmental 
issues have been touched upon above. The efficiency issues can be by questioned when initial 
allocation of land and sea space is done for free and the conditions for the Coase theorem to 
work are not fulfilled. For instance, initial occupiers can determine how to use the land, and 
since land costs nothing, the opportunity cost is normally not fully considered. The equity 
dimension is discussed when the property right to resources does not accrue to the public at 
large but to a limited number of private firms. The Norwegian Government, partly based on 
proposals from the Parliament, is considering introducing some kind of resource taxation for 
the aquaculture industry and in September 2018 appointed a committee to assess, within a 
year or so, the taxation of aquaculture.16 The issues are, however, not new in the policy 
discourse. Very modest taxation of aquaculture expansion was introduced from 2002, and in 
2017-18 some additional production capacity was sold through auctions.17 Of course, 
aquaculture firms pay ordinary profit tax, local property tax, etc., when appropriate.  
 









6.  CONCLUSION  
The discussion of types of rent in aquaculture concludes that market rent and Ricardo rent are 
the essential ones to consider in this case. Based on this, the Faustmann rent and site values 
are discussed. However, market rent exists only when an aquaculture industry has some 
market power for its products, such as for Norwegian salmon, which serves more than half of 
the world’s market. Vietnamese shrimp has a much lower market share, about ten percent in a 
very competitive world market, and the farms, on average, hardly generate any resource rent. 
Faustmann rent varies among farms, and is affected by market conditions and regulatory 
regimes, in addition to biophysical conditions underlying the Ricardo formula.  
Business economic and welfare economic indicators are discussed and compared, as well as 
calculated for the two industries. The performance indicators have either revenue or capital in 
the denominator. Since Vietnam has relatively little capital in shrimp production, indicators 
based on capital are very high; ROC and RRR equal 87.0 and 70.0 percent, respectively. For 
Norway, these two indicators are 33.9 and 36.0 for ROC and RRR, respectively; still very 
high compared to other industries in Norway, but much lower than for shrimp in Vietnam. On 
the other hand, the net profit margin and resource rent margin for salmon are 36.1 and 34.7 
percent, respectively. This is much higher than the corresponding figures of 9.6 and 7.2 
percent for the WLS in Vietnam. Salmon production is very capital intensive and shrimp 
production is a low capital industry for the two countries discussed, and these factors cause 
the anomalies between indicators based on capital and revenue. 
The salmon industry in Norway generates huge resource rent due to constraints on 
production and export, partly due to government licensing and partly due to fish diseases, 
including the lice parasite, and high mortality that hampers production. In contrast, Vietnam 
does not use licences and the entry and exit conditions for shrimp farms are close to that of a 
fully competitive industry. With a relatively little market share it is also a question whether 
export restriction could influence prices positively. The challenges ahead may rather be in 
quality improvements, both in products and in production processes to improve local 
environmental conditions. Studies of seafood and other food product markets have indicated 
that greening may be beneficial for both consumers and producers. The Vietnamese shrimp 
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Rotation – Faustmann rule 
At the beginning of each rotation, when juveniles are released into the cage, the present value 
for that particular rotation is 𝛱(𝑡) = 𝑉(𝑡)𝑒−𝛿𝑡. Since all rotations are of the same length (for 
constant parameters across time), the present value of the profit of n rotations at the time of 
release of the first cohort is 
(A1)  𝜋𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑉(𝑡)𝑒
−𝛿𝑡 + 𝑉(𝑡)𝑒−2𝛿𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑉(𝑡)𝑒−𝑛𝛿𝑡 = 𝑉(𝑡)𝑒−𝛿𝑡(1 + 𝑒−𝛿𝑡 +
𝑒−2𝛿𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑒−(𝑛−1)𝛿𝑡) = 𝑉(𝑡)𝑒−𝛿𝑡𝐴,  
where  
𝐴 = 1 + 𝑒−𝛿𝑡 + 𝑒−2𝛿𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝑒−(𝑛−1)𝛿𝑡 






For the infinite horizon case 




Using the first order condition for the maximum of 𝜋𝑛(𝑡) the Faustmann rule can be derived 







The rotation problem was formulated by the German forester M. Faustmann in 1849, and was 
simplified and solved mathematically in Pressler (1860). An alternative way of writing (A3) is 








Further, we may use the capital growth when the value of fish at time t depends on individual 
weight w(t), number of fish N(t), and price of fish p(t). Using this in the Faustmann rule (A3) 













The stylized logistic salmon growth used for Figure 1 is 

























w(t) is the weight of fish at age t, w’(t)=dw(t)/dt, w∞=maximum weight of fish, wo=weight of 
recruits (smolt) at release time t=0. 
 Parameters for Figure 1; derived to yield an approximation to the actual growth situation for 
Norwegian salmon  in 2015, using findings in Jobling (2003), Olsen and Hasan (2012) and 
Thyholdt (2014), though excluding seasonal growth. 
 Symbol 2015~rounded used 
Intrinsic growth rate, per day r 0.009 
Maximum weight of fish w∞ 16.0             (kg) 
Weight of recruits w0  0.12             (kg) 




Price of fish p 34.57~34.50 NOK/kg 
Interest rate, annual (per day) δ 0.10 (δ/365) 
Mortality rate, annual (per day) M 0.15 (M/365) 
Source: Flaaten, 2018. 
